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The traditional  measure  of effective  protection  based  on gross
value  added  does  not fully  reflect  the incentives  of the  protection
structure when the domestic price of capital goods differs
substantially  from the international  price.  In particular,  reform-
ing  India's trade  policies  and  reducing  its protection  rates  would
be meaningless - even damaging  - if India does not first
reduce  its high protection  on capital  goods.
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A striking feature of India's protective structure  effective protection rate" (NEPR). The relevance
has been high tariffs and protection on capital  of these notions and their magnitude are tested
goods, which limit industrial competitiveness  on a sample of 60 industrial projects in India.
and export potential, and distort industrial
incentives as indicated in "effective protection  The paper confirms the finding in a previous
rates" (EPRs).  Bank review of India's industrial sector that
effective protective rates averaged about 40
The distortions introduced by high capital  percent in the sector, with large variations
and investment costs resulting from high levels  between the industrial subsectors and within
of protection were corrected in India's analysis  each subsector.
by introducing the notion of "corrected effective
protection rates" (CEPRs). In theory, EPRs  Using NEPRs, the paper shows that on
computed on the basis of value added net of  average the amount of effective protection
depreciation could be made immune from capital  available from India's protective structure is just
cost distortions, provided that depreciation  enough to compensate for the high cost of
allowances are computed on economically  investment that results from heavy protection of
meaningful grounds and that EPRs based on net  capital goods. Most projects have, in effect,
value added ar-e  available. But in India as in  negative NEPRs, so they are at a disadvantage
many developing countries, available EPRs are  compared to foreign competitors.
based on gross value added. The need to account
for the substantial capital cost distortions led to  Finally, the paper argues that reforming
the use of a substitute tool, the CEPR.  India's trade policies and reducing its protection
rates would be mcaniingless  - even damaging
The paper provides a brief refresher, and  - if India does not first reduce protection on
geometrical interpretations, on the definition of  capital goods. When warranted, the nominal
F.PR and its limited interpretation as a measure  protection rate for capital goods should be
of the scope for inefficiency or extra profit  slashed to the lowest possible level above the
resulting from protection. It introduces the  shadow premium for foreign exchange.
notions and fornulae  for the CEPR and the "net
ThePolicy Research Working PaperSerics disseminates the findingsof work under way in thc Bank. Anobjectiveof the series
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AnnexesMEASURE  AND  INTERPRETATION  OF EFFECTIVE  PROTECTION  IN  THE
PRESENCE  OF  HIGH CAPITAL  COSTS :  THE  EVIDENCE  FROH  INDIA
Introductin
1.  This  paper is derived  from  a previous  Working  Paper [61  prepared
within  a comprehensive  review  of India's  trade  regime  and  protection  policies.
One  striking  feature  df India's  protection  structure  has been  the  very  high
tariffs  and  protection  on capital  goods,  thereby  harming  industrial
competitiveness  (and  export  potential)  and  distorting  industrial  incentives  as
they  are indicated  by Effective  Protection  Rates  (EPRs).
2.  The  distortions  introduced  by the  high  capital  and investment  costs  re-
sulting  from the  protection  levels  on capital  goods  were corrected  in  India's
analysis  by introducing  the  notion  of Corrected  Effective  Protection  Rates
(CEPRs).  In theory,  EPRs computed  on the  basis  of Value  Added (VA)  net  of de-
preciation  could  be made immune  from  capital  cost  distortions,  provided  that
depreciation  allowances  are  computed  on economically  meaningful  grounds  and
that  EPRs  based  on net  VA are  available.  Because  in India,  as in  many  other
LDCs,  available  EPRs are  based  on gross  VA, the  need to account  for  the  subs-
tantial  capital  cost distortions  led  the  analysis  to use  a substitute  tool,
the  CEPR (defined  in para.  14  below).  Despite  the  formulae  and  equations  deve-
loped  herein,  the  CEPR is  not  a theoretical  development  or addition  to the
abundant  litterature  on Effective  Protection.  More specifically,  the  CEPR
notion  is  a pragmatic  one,  and does  not pretend  to substitute  to th.-  equili-
brium  EPRs  associated  to a general-  or partial-equilibrium  model  and to  an
equilibrium  exchange  rate.  It is  meant,  more simply,  to  provide  the  prac-
titioner  with a correcting  tool  for interpreting,  under  static  conditions  in a
country,  EPR  estimates  as indicators  of the  relative  incentives  between
industries  in that  country,  and to interpret  EPRs  from an angle  somewhat
different  from  the traditional  theoretical  angle.
3.  With  these  limitations  and  modest  objectives  in  mind, the  paper  presents
three  main  themes.  First,  it provides  a brief  refresher  on the definition  of
EPR  and its  lim4ted  interpretation  as a measure  of the  scope  for  inefficiency
or extra-profit  resulting  from  protection,  with  a simple  geometrical  repre-
sentation.  In the second  part (and  Annex  1),  the  paper  introduces  the  notions
and  formulae  of CEPR and  Net  Effective  Protection  (NEPR),  also  with a geome-
trical  representation.  Finally,  the  paper  tests  the  relevance  of these
notions,  and  assesses  their  magnitude,  in the  case  of India  on the  basis  of a
sample  of some 60 industrial  projects.  Finally,  a  brief  conclusion  summarizes
the  major  findings  and  draws  some  tentative  conclusions.
Basic  definitions  and conce2ts
4.  The concept  and definitions  of effective  protection  (cf. [21,  [3]  and
[41)  were  originally  prompted  by the  desirability,  when analyzing  the  amount
of incentives  provided  to industry  by a given  structure  and level  of tariff
nominal  protection,  to  net out  from  the  nominal  protection  granted  to the
output  of an industrial  transformation  process  the  additional  costs  charged  to
inputs  on account  of the  protection  enjoyed  by these  inputs.
5.  This  net effect  of protection  on inputs  and  output  is logically  measured-2-
on the  difference  between  the  value  of  output  and  that  of inputs  (including
non-tradeables),  i.e.  the  gross  Value  Added  before  depreciation.  The  Effective
Protection  Coefficient  (EPC)  is  defined  as:
EPC - VAd/VAw , shown to be - NPCi +  (NPCo - NPCi)/a  (1), where:
- VAd  and  VAw  are  the  Value  Added  measured  respectively  with  domestic
and international  border  prices  (non-tradeable  inputs  are in  both  cases
valued  with  domestic  prices);
- "a"  is  the  Value  Added  to  output  ratio  in  international  prices
(a - VAw/POw - 1 - (PIw *  q)/POw, where POw and PIw are the respective
international  prices  of output  and input,  and  q is the  gj_xe4  quantity  of
input  per  unit  of  output;  a is  by definition  smaller  than  1);  and
- NPCo  and  NPCi  are  the  respective  Nominal  Protection  Coefficients  of
output  and  inputs.'  NPCs  in  turn  are  defined  to  be the  ratio  between
the  domestic  (ex-factory,  before  indirect  taxes)  price  of a tradeable
good  and  its  international  border  price. 2
The  formula  indicates  clearly  that  any  difference  in  nominal  protection
coefficients  between  inputs  and  output  is  amplified  by the  factor  1/a  into  an
effective  protection  coefficient  different  from  NPCI  or  NPCo.
6.  This  mechanism  is illustrated  by
Graph  1.  The  horizontal  axis  is  measured  Pnces  Graph  1
in  terms  of  NPCs,  and  the  vertical  axis
measures  the  international  prices  Pw  and  , 
domestic  prices  Pd  of input  and  output.  P-  _--
For NPC - 1 (i.e.  no protection), the  _ _
vertical  bar  displays  the  composition  of
POw  betweer.  its  Value  Added  VAw  and  its  V'  'VAd
input  cost  CIw  - q * PIw  at international  POw  _
prices.  Point  A indicates  the input  cost
at domestic  prices  corresponding  to  NPCi,  ,  . A
and  point  D the  output  domestic  price  POd  VAw
corresponding  to  NPCo.  The  vertical.  bar  ,  Cld
for NPCo displays rhe components of POd,  c.-  ,-w
i.e. the Value Adde  'lkd  and the input  _  ___  -
cost  CId - q * PId  a  :tomestic  prices.  0  1  NPCi  NPCO  NPC
1 For  the  sake  of simplification,  only  one  input  is  considered  in  the
definitior.  of "a".  The  argument  is  easily  generalized  to  the  case  of  several
inputs,  including  non-tradeables.  In such  case,  NPCi  would  simply  be an  avera-
ge  of the  NPCis  of each  input,  weighted  by the  input  values  consumed  per  unit.
2 In  a protection  regime  without  Quantitative  Restrictions  (QRs)  which
permits  unconstrained  competition  from  imports,  domestic  prices  of tradeables
align  themselves  with  the  import  prices  after  tariff  duty.  Thus  nominal  pro-
tection  coefficients  are  equal  to  1 plus  the  tariff  rate.  Otherwise,  domestic
ex-factory  prices  (before  indirect  taxes)  are  the  result  of  various  effects  of
QRs  and  tariffs  relative  to the  degree  of  domestic  competition  in  the  industry
and  of the  supply/demand  balance  generated  by the  regulatory  policies.  In  such
cases,  the  realized  nominal  protection  is  best  captured  by the  observed  ratio
of the  domestic  ex-factory  price  to the  international  border  price  (CIF).  It
is  this  latter  definition  of  the  NPC  which  is  used  throughout  this  note.- 3 -
It is  clear from  the graph's  geometry  that:
EPC - VAd/VAw  - AB/VAw  +  BC/VAw  - NPCi/l  +  CD *  POw/l  *  l/VAw
hence thei  formula (1)  above,  since  CD - NPCo - NPCi. 3
7.  Whenever EPC Is greater  than  1, i.e.  a positive  Effective  Protection
Rate EPR - EPC-1, the additional  Value Added  generated  by the industry  in
excess  of VAw can be used to remunerate/pay  the production  factors  of labor
and capital  above the remunerations  they  receive in  VAw at international
prices.  This reallocation  of Value Added  can take several  forms,  as follows:
- production  factors  are consumed  or remunerated  in excess  of their
consumption  or remuneration  under international  prices (i.e.,  undez a free-
trade  regime),  due t;o  policy  or operational  inefficiencies;
- if  production  factors  are  used and priced efficiently  by international
standards,  the  remuneration  of capital  above the fixed  costs  of capital,  ,
the accounting  profit itself,  is increased  by the  amount  VAd - VAw  which then
represents  a "rent"  granted  by the positive  effective  protection;  and
- any combination  of these  two cases.
The causes for inefficiency  in the first  case above (excluding  the extreme  ca-
se  of excessive  input  consumption,  where VAd and EPC are artifi-ially  reduced)
can  be a combination  of: (i)  x-inefficiency  in the  use of labor (excess  labor,
low  productivity,  high regulated  wages,...)  or in the  use of capital (unecono-
mic size of plant below  MES, capacity  under-utilization,...);  and 'ii)  alloca-
tion distortions  created  by unappropriate  policies  (e.g.,  pricing policies).
8.  To distinguish  between  the cases  of inefficiency  (operation  or policy
based)  and those  of extra-profit  (protection  rent), it is  necessary  to analyze
one step further  the breakdown  of VAw and VAd between their  different  compo-
nents  and to compare  their  respective  values in  both cases.  Value Added
comprises  three  main components:
VA - L +  FK + P ,
where:  L is the total  Labor  cost;
FK is the fixed  cost of capital (depreciation,  and eventually
interest  on term  debt if any);  and
P is the profit (gross).4
An interpretation  of the Effective  Protection  Rate
9.  The first two cases  evoked in  para. 7 of reallocation  of Value  Added
between  its components  are illustrated  by Graphs  2-A and 2-B. In  both cases,
3  By definition,  EPC - VAd/VAw  - (NPCo.POw  - NPCi.PIw.q)/(POw  - PIw.q).
Algebraic  manipulation  gives  EPC - [NPCo - NPCi.(l-a)]/a  ,  hence formula  (l).
4  Gross  profit P in turn  can be split  between income  tax and  net profit.
In case of a rent extracted  from positive  effective  protection,  part  of the
rent can be appropriated  by the government  through  a higher tax  T. However,
because the role of T is peripheral  to the argument  developed  in this  note,
gross  profit P will here be used in  preference  to  net profit.  Cf. Annex 1.- 4 -
the situation  with protection  (L.e.,  with  NPCs different  from 2.)  is de facto
compared  to the situation  where  all NPCs are equal  to 1, that is the  free-
trade  regime.  The reference  comparator  can be either  a foreign  competitor  ope-
rating  under international  prices (e.g.,  ln Hong-Kong)  or the same industry  in
the same country  after an hypothetical  trade  reform  to a free-trade  regime. In
either  case, international  prices  establish  the reference  basis  and values for
VA, th<  output and input  prices  and the profit-return  on investment.  Pd
greater  than  Pw is generally  interpreted  to represent  a case of extra-profit
or protection  rent (graph  2-B).  When Ld is greater  than  Lw, x-inefficiency  in
the  use of labor  is probable.  If  FKd is  greater than  FKw, it can be due to x-
inefficiency  in the use of capital  per unit of output (uneconomic  plant size,
under-utilization  of capacity,  i.e.  quantity  effect) 5, or to higher  prices
paid for fixed  capital (price  effect,  cf.  next section).
Graph  2
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10.  For these  reasons,  the Effective  Prctection  Rate (EPR),  the difference
of EPC to 1, can be interpreted  to be a measure  of the scope  for inefficiency
or extra-profit  granted  by the difference  VAw - VAd result.ng  from protection
on  input  and output.  For instance,  an industry  with an EPR of +30% can  pay or
remunerate  its  labor  and capitul 30%  more than  a competitor  operating  under
international  prices,  or it  could axtract  a profit  (after  paying the labor
cost  and the fixed  cost  of capltal)  substantlally  above that of the  competi-
tor, depending  on the cost  of capital  and the  resulting  distribution  of Value
Added  between its  components.
11.  The standard  interpretation  of EPRs  as a  measure  of the scope  for inef-
ficiency  or extra-profit  assumes  implicitely  that behind  the difference  bet-
ween FKd and FKw there is  only a quantity  effect  but no price effect,  and that
the  price of capital is  approximately  similar  or constant  under the two situa-
tions  being  compared (free-trade  versus  protection).  This implicit  assumption
is largely  correct  in  most cases  and countries,  where the industrial  policies
5  In subsectors  characterized  by slgnificant  economies  of scale (gene-
rally fluid-processitg  industries  such  as chemicals),  the investment  cost  per
unit of output increases  by about 25X each time  the capacity  is reduced  by
half. If capacity  C  under-utilized,  the unit  capital  cost is inversely  rela-
ted to the capacity  utilization  rate. In both  cases,  x-inefficiency  In selec-
tion  or operation  of the production  process  generates  a FKd  greater than the
FKw of the  efficient  international  price-maker  in the considered  industry.-5-
are designed  to  keep costs  of Lnvestment  and capital  goods clove  to interna-
tional  prices,  in order  to avoid loading  production  costs  with locked-in
financial  a'nd  fiscal  charges  over the llfe  of industrial  projects.  In  all
developed  cou,.trie9  and  practically  all developing  countr:es,  import  tariffs
and nominal  pzotection  applied  to capital  goods  are quite low,  much lower  than
tariffs  and protection  applLed  to other tradeables,  and capital  goods  are of-
ten exempt  from import  duties  and domestic  taxes.  For instance,  in Brazil
which has highly  protected  its domestic  industry,  tariff  collection  rates on
machinery in  the mid-80L  were in  the 11-17%  range.  In Korea,  they  were about
9% for domestic  use, and negligible  for  ezport  production.  Even in Pakistan
(which  has the second  highest overall  tariff  collection  rate after India),
tariff collection  rates  on machinery  were 15% in 1987/88.
Corrected  Protection  under  a distQrted  price  of fixed  capital 6
12.  By contrast,  India is almost  unique in levying  high tariffs  and taxes  on
capital  goods.  Its average  tariff  collection  rate on  machinery  was about 70%
in 1987/88,  and this  high protection  in favor  of its  domestic  capital  goods
industry  (coupled  with strict  QRs) has led to  NPCs averaging  about 1.40  for
domestic  capital  goAds.  As a result, investment  costs  of industrial  projects
in India  are, ceteris  p4rLbus,  about 50%  highez on average than investment
costs  of comparable  projects  at international  prices 16].
13.  Under a structure  of high protectlon  and prices for  capital  goods,
higher investment  costs entail impllcitely  that: (i)  Value  Added generated  by
an industrial  project  normally include  a larger  amount  of capital  remuneration
(depreciation,  interest,  and  profit as return  on equity);  and (ii)  thus domes-
tic Value  Added VAd exceed  Value  Added at international  prices VAw,  with a
resulting  positive  EPR, even if the domestic  firm is  efficiently  operated  by
international  standards.  A high price  of capital  goods  and investment,  charac-
terlzed  by an average  NPC for capital  goods (NPCk)  substantially  above 1,
generates  in the value added  at domestic  prices  a fixed  capital  cost FRd  which
is approximately  proportionate  to NPCk ( depreciation  and interest  charges
are, ceteris  paribus,  a fixed  proportion  of the total investment  cost).  Assu-
ming (for  the sake of simplicity)  that  the labor  cost  L would not substan-
tially  decrease,  at least  in the short/medium  term, if the project  were to
operate  under free-trade,  a hlgh NPCk  requires  a high FKd  which thus  cuts down
profit  Pd, in  particular  when NPCk
is  higher  than the output  NPCo.  This
mechanism  is illustrated  by the  Pes  Graph 3  .
graph 3  where FKd, the projection  of  .
FK on the  vertical line  NPCk, is  Pd
proportionate  to NPCk. When NPCk  .-
increases  (horizontal  arrow),  FKd
increases,  as well as FKd's  pro-
jection  on the  VAd vertical line.  P
The portion  of VAd other  than Ld  .-  .--  :
(fixed)  and FKd shrinks  (vertical  - .-  -.-...-.- 
arrow),  up to a point  where the  ,.:  . '
resldual  room left for  profit can  -__  ______.'_
vanish  altogether.  X  I  N.i  NPC.  NPCk
6  The issues  associated  with a distorted  price of financial  capital (e.g.
interest  aubsidies)  on EPRs have been extensively  analyzed  in the litterature.
They are not the subject  of this  paper,  and are  not addressed  herein.
If-6-
14.  It is  generally  desirable  that the lndustrial  and trade policles  provide
all investors  with a minimum  return  on investment,  for a number of reasons
(attract  foreign  investment,  encourage  domestic  livestment,  leave to the dom-
estic industry  enough  profit to permit  it to lnvesc  ln modernizatlon,  innova-
tion  and R&D and thas keep  abreast  wlth its  foreign  competitors,...).  Again,  a
good benchmark  for the  minimum  return  would be the the return  on investment
available  from international  prices under the  free-trade  regime. Intuitively,
VAd should  have a minimum level  to cover, in  addition  to the  labor cost  L, a
total  remuneration  of capital  FKd  +  Pd equivalent  to (FKv  +  Pw)  multiplied  by
the inflating  factor  NPCk  of the Lnvestment  cost 7. When the  magnitude  of
distortion  is slgnificant,  i.e.  when NPCk is significantly  above 1, it is
shown in  Annex 1 that,  for various  definitions  of the return  on investment,
this  minimum  value of VAd corresponds  to a unique  value of the  EPR, denoted
CEPR,  which ls:
CEPR - (1 - s).(NPCk  -1)  (2), whenever "s"  - L/VAw,  the
labor content  of VAw, is
moderate (say  below 30%).
CEPR is called  herein the  Corrected  Effective  Protection  Rate,  because
it is the level  of EPR just sufficient  to compensate  for the  higher price  of
capital  and earn the return  on investment  achievable  under the free-trade
regime (if  operating  efficiently). 8 It  measures the  Rrice  effect of invest-
ment cost policies  on effective  protection.  The difference EPR - CEPR  - NEPR
is called  the Net Effective  Protection  Rate; it indicates  the additlonal
protection  available  above (resp.  under) the  CEPR, and thus the scope  for x-
inefficiency  or extra-profit  (resp.  the  obligation  for extra  x-efficiency  or
loss).
15.  The VAd assoclated  to CEPR  corresponds  to a level  for the output  price
POd, corresponding  in turn to the  associated  concept  of Corrected  Nominal
Protectlen  Rate for the output,  denoted  CNPRo,  which is:
CNPRo  - a.CEPR  +  (1 -a).NPRi  (3)  (cf.  Annex 1)
The first  term of the sum represents  the impact  of the investment  cost  on the
output  production  cost, and the second  term represents  the impact  of input
costs.  The difference  NPRo - CNPRo  - NNPRo between  the  actual nominal
protection  rate  of the output  and CNPRo is similarly  called  the Net Nominal
Protectlon  Rate for the output.  A balanced  and equitable  structure  of
protection  rates  for output, inputs  and capital  goods (thus  for NPCo,  NPCi and
NPCk)  leaving  no room for x-inefficiencies  nor extra-profit  would be
characterlzed  by low or  null NEPRs,  or equivalently  NNPRs.
16.  The concept of Corrected  Protection  (effective  or nominal) ls  not
rhetorical.  The case  of India,  analyzed  in the following  section,  illustrates
7 In all rigor,  Value Added comprises  also the financial  costs  of working
capital,  which ls roughly  proportlonate  to the average  NPCL. But this is
negligible  when NPCk ls sign!flcantly  above 1.
8 Using  one unit of VAw as numeraire,  formula (2)  can be interpreted
simply:  the additlonal  VAd over VAw (CEPR)  is required  for the remuneration
of the addltional  investment  cost (NPCk  - 1) at the rate (1 - s). In [6]  and
an earlier  version  of this  paper,  CEPR  was called  Compensatory  Effective
Protectlon  Rate,  which carrled  an undesirable  normative  connotation.-7-
the  substantf%l  impact  of  high  investment  cost4  policies  on the  l1vel  cf
protection  required  to  ensure  the  profitability  of industrial  investmew;ts.
Furthermore,  in  countries  or  cases  where  investsuerc  costs  are  nor  distorted
upwards  but  where  other  policies  (protection,  competition)  permit  the  finan-
cial  viability  of  plants  below  Minimum  Economic  Scales  (MES),  the  unit  inves-
tment  costs  will  be  substantially  higher  than  those  of the  internationally
efficient  reference  comparator  (cf.  footnote  5).  In  such  cases,  a similar  ana-
lysis  with  the  price  factor  NPCk  replaced  by  the  quantity  factor  "x"  (cf.
Annex  1)  would  permit  to  separate  the  effect  of  uneconomic  capacity  choices
and  underutilization  (CEPR)  from  that  of  other  operational  x-inefficiencies
(NEPR).  Also,  distorted  investment  costs  can  erect  barriers  on  new  entry  and
competition  against  incumbents.  In  all  these  cases,  the  interpretations  and
policy  conclusions  to  be  derived  from  EPR  analyses  should  establish  first
whether  the  concept  of Corrected  Protection  is  significantly  relevant  to the
case,  and  if  so  separate  CEPR  protection  from  NEPR  protection.
A case  study:  India
17.  Some  60  industrial  projects  (mostly  in  the  engineering  and  chemical
industries)  financed  in  1988  and  1989  by India's  Development  Finance  Insti-
tutions  were  analyzed  in  preparation  for  the  World  Bank's  review  of the  trade
regime  of  India  ([1]  and  [6j).  The  available  data  were  extracted  from  project
appraisal  reports  prepared  by Indian  DFIs  which  reported  systematically  the
international  price  equivalents  of  output,  input  and  investment  domestic
prices  for  the  standard  computation  of  Economic  Internal  Rates  of  Return
(ERRs).  Notwithstanding  the  limitations  of the  available  data,  the  analysis
provided  valuable  indications  of the  incentives  and  disincentives  resulting
from  the  protection  structure  as they  are  perceived  ex-ant by project
promoters  and  financiers  in India.  The  following  section  summarizes  the
quantitative  results  of  the  analysis  and  underlines  the  significance  of
corrected  protection  under  the  set  of  values  taken  in  India  by the  principal
parameters  of  the  protection  structure.
18.  In  India,  the  factor  representing  the  ratio  of investment  costs  (per
unit  of  output)  in  domestic  to  world  prices  is  substantially  above  1  for  seve-
ral  reasons.  First,  collected  teriff  duties  on  imported  capital  goods  are
high,  averaging  some  70%  over  the  sample  (cf.  [6]).  Only  electronics  industry
machinery  enioys  a lower  tariff  duty  of  35%,  while  other  industries  in  the
sample  pay  an average  tariff  duty  of  80%  on their  imported  equipment.  Second-
ly,  locally  procured  capital  goods,  generally  representing  a large  share  of
total  equipment,  carry  purchase  prices  which  average  40%  above  international
prices.  Thirdly,  other  goods  and  materials  used  in investment  projects,  cement
especially,  are  charged  substantial  excise  and  other  taxes  which  increase
further  the  financial  costs  of  investment  above  international  costs. 9
19.  As  per  its  objectives,  the  India  review  focussed  exclusively  on  the
effect  of  protection  and  pricing  policies,  especially  for  capital  goods,  on
the  competitiveness  and  the  structure  of  production  costs  in  industry.  For
this  reason,  the  analysis  considered  only  the  price  factor  NPCk  in  the
assessment  and  determination  of  effective  protection  and  of the  associated
CEPRs,  leaving  aside  the  quantity  factors  due  to  x-inefficiencies  in  the
selection  and  operations  of  project  capacities.  The  estimate  of  NPCk  is  the
9  Another  reason,  relevant  essentially  to  the  quantity  factor  "x",  is
that  the  overall  level  of  protection  has  encouraged  the  entry  of  many  projects
with  uneconomic  plant  sizes  below  MES  and  low  utilization.  Cf.  para.  29.- 8 -
ratio  of tha  financial  investment  cost  to the same  adjusted  for tariff  diltlies
on imported  equipment  and for  the  high  prices  of local  equipment  (the  first
two  price  fActors  described  in the  previous  paragraph). 10
20.  As noted in para.  16 and  Annex 1, the  simple  formula  desin 4ing the  CEPR
is  valid  provided  that  the share  "s"  of labor  costs in  VAw is  relatively
small.  Parameter  "s"  was  estimated  for  each sample  project  by adding  to the
direct  labor  cost  the "overheads"  costs  (which  comprise  not only  non-direct
labor  but also certain  services  inputs  such  as telephone,...).  The estimated
values  of "s'  represent  thus  an upper  limit  of the labor  content  of Value
Added  VAw. It is cle  .- that "s" is  indeed  small  in these  projects,  as shown  by
the  following  table  which summarizes  the  basic parameters  of the  samp'e:
TABLE 1:  BASIC  PARAMETERS  OF  THE PROJECT  SaMPLE /a
SubsectrqMs  Sample  share oX)  ICOR  Factor  s  Factor  NPCk
Nc.proi.  VAw  (X
Heavy  Chemicals  17  20  3.2  12  1.36
Synthetic  Yarns  7  15  3.1  12  1.54
Basic  Steel  Goods  12  7  2.4  19  1.46
Heavy  Miscellns  9  13  4.1  21  1.42
Avera3.e  Intermdtes  45  55  3.3  15  1.43
Light  Chemicals  5  3  1.6  19  1.33
Food  Industries  7  6  1.9  16  1.36
Electronics  17  12  1.3  25  1.25
Other  Engineering  26  24  1.5  17  1.45
Avge Final  Goods  55  45  1.5  20  1.38
Overall  Average  100  100  2.5  17  1.42
/a  All parameters  in this table  are  weighted  averages.
Source:  Annex 2
21.  The sample  data  confirm  that:  (i) investment  costs in India  are
substantially  higher than international  costs,  by about 42X on account  of the
price  of capital  goods;  and (ii)  selected  processes  and technologies  are
capital-intensive  with a low  share "s"  of labor  costs in the  value  added  VAw
(17X  on average,  with a maximum  of 25X in  electronics).  The data  reveal  also
the  presence  in  t-v sample  of two  distinct  groups  of industries:  (i)  the  first
group  consists  oi  heavy  industries  producing  intermediates  and inputs,  with
ICORs  generally  above  3 and a low  "s"  averaging  15X;  and (ii)  the second  group
comprises  less  capital-intensive  industries  producing  final  goods,  with ICORs
around  1.5  and a slightly  higher "s"  averaging  20X.
10  A second  estimate  NPCk2 is  the ratio  between  the financial  investment
cost to the  leconomic"  invastment  cost (used  for  ERR computation),  which
captures  not only the effect  of capital  goods  prices  but also the  price
distortions  of other goods  and factors  (e.g.,  cement).  This second  estimate
represento  an  upper limit  of t  i  cumulative  effects  of all forms  of investment
taxation  in India.  Results  corresponding  to  NPCk2  are given in the  Annexes.-9-
22.  The  relktive  magnitudes  of NPCk  and 's"  justify  the  application  of the
CEPR  formul&  of para.14.  Table  2  below  presents  both  the  resulting  CEPRs  and
the  actual  Effective  Protection  Rates  (EPR),  as  well  as the  NEPRs.  These
results  indicate  large  inter-sectoral  variations  in EPRs  and  NEPRs.  Sub-
sectoral  CEPRs  (adequately  weighted  by VAw)  range  between  15%  for  electronics
to 30-40%  for  most other  subsectors  and  up to  45% in synthetic  yarns.
Furthermore,  though  the  overall  average  NEPR Is  null (within  an error  it-  gin
of +  10%),  the  large  inter-sectoral  variations  of NEPRs  indicate  unequal
incentives  from  one  subsector  to the  other.  The  only subsector  where  the
actual  EPR is close  to CEPR is  Heavy  Chemicals.  Positive  NEPRs  are  significant
(25%)  in Basic  Steel  Products  and  Synthetic  Yarns,  and substantial  (47%)  in
Heavy  Miscellaneous  industries  (paper,  tyras).  Nezative  NEPRs  are  tiodest  in
electronics  (7%),  significant  in  food industries  (22%),  substantial  in  light
chemicals  (34%)  and large  in  engineering  industries  (52%).
TABLE  2:  CORRECTED  AND  ACTUAL  EFFECTIVE  PROTECTION  BY SUBSECTOR/a
Distributn(%)
Actual  of Projects
Subsector  CEPR (X)  EPR (%)  NEPR(%) with +/-  NEPR
Heavy  Chemicals  28  37  9  60/40
Light  Chemicals  28  -6  -34  0/100
Synthetic  Yarns  44  70  26  50/50
Basic  Steel  Products  37  60  23  57/43
Electronics  14  7  -7  60/40
Other  Engineering  40  -12  -52  0/100
Food Industries  30  8  -22  50/50
Ileavy  Miscellaneous  30  77  47  80/20
Overall  30  30  0  42/58
/a  CEPRs,  NEPRs  and  Actual  EPRs in  this  table  are  averages  weighted  by VAw.
Source:  Annex  3
23.  Indian  policy-makers  have traditionally  tried  to adjust  nominal
protection  levels  to their  perceived  need  of each  industry,  or product-group,
through  a multiplicity  of ad-hoc  tariffs  and  exemptions.  The large  inter-
sectoral  variations  in  NEPR  reflect  the  ad-hocism  and inadequacy  of such
protection  policies.  This is further  illustrated  by the intra-sectoral
discrepancies  within  each subsector.  Only in light  chemicals  and engineering
are  all  the  projects  subject  to the same  incentive  (negative  NEPR),  as
indicated  by the last  column  of Table  2. In  practically  every  other  subsector,
the  projects  are distributed  in  approximately  equal  shares  between  those
benefitting  from a positive  NEPR  and  those  subject  to a negative  NEPR,  which
can  be construed  to be the  result  of a quasi-random  prccess.  The structure  of
Effective  Protection  in India  provides  thus  very  heterogeneous  incentives.
24.  The  use of the  Corrected  Nominal  Protection  rates  (CNPRs,  cf.  para.15)
permits  to estimate  the  respective  impacts  of capital  costs  and input  costs  on- 10  -
the  production  costs  and  competitiveness  of Indian  industries.  The results  are
summarized  in  Table  3  below  which  presents  the  subsectoral  CNPRs  along  with
the  actual  Nominal  Protection  Rates  (NPRs)  and the  Net  nominal  protection
rates  (NNPRs).  An important  conclusion  emerges  from the  table.  Surcharges  on
capital  and investment  costs  related  to the  CEPR (first  column  of the  table)
increase  domestic  prices  on average  by 12%  of output's  international  prices.
Extra  price  and  cost  of inputs  increase  domestic  prices  on average  by 31%.  The
overall  impact  is that  the  sample  projects  require  normally  a Corrected
Nominal  Protection  rate (CNPR)  of 43%  on average,  s:y  about  45%,  two-thirds  of
which  to offset  the impact  of high input  costs  and une-third  to offset  the
impact  of high capital  and investment  costs.
TABLE  3:  CORRECTED  AND  ACTUAL  NOMINAL  PROTECTION  BY SUBSECTOR/a
(In  % of Output  Value  at International  Prices)
Distributn(%)
VA/CEPR.  Input  Cost  Actual  of Projects
Subsector  Impact  Impact  CNPR  NPR  NNPR  with  +/-  NNPR
Heavy  Chemicals  10  46  56  59  3  60/40
Light  Chemicals  15  19  34  16  -18  0/100
Synthetic  Yarns  17  46  63  65  3  50/50
Basic  Steel  Goods  10  50  60  62  2  57/43
Electronics  3  31  34  32  -2  60/40
Other  Engineering  19  24  44  19  -25  0/100
Food Industries  1  23  24  26  2  50/50
Miscellaneous  6  31  37  46  9  80/20
Overall  12  31  43  36  -7  42/58
/a  CNPRs,  NNPRs  and  Actual  NPRs in this  table  are  averages  weighted  by
Output  in  world  prices.
Source:  Annex  4
25.  The  concordance  between  actual  and  compensatory  NPRs is  higher  than  for
effective  protection. The actual  NPR is close  to CNPR for  Heavy  Chemicals,
Synthetic  Yarns,  Basic  steel  products,  Electronics  and  Food industries.
Positive  NNPR is  negligible  (about  9%)  in the  Miscellaneous  industries
(dominated  in the  sample  by Tyres). On the  other  hand,  negative  NNPRs  are
significant  in engineering  industries  (25%)  and in  Light  Chemicals  (18%).
Finally,  the  intra-sectoral  discrepancies  observed  within  each  subsector  for
effective  protection  (cf.  para.  23)  are  equally  applicable  to the  nominal
protection,  as summarized  in the  last  column  of the  table  above.  Except  for
light  chemicals  and  engineering  industries  where  all  projects  are subject  to
negative  NNPR,  the  projects  in  each  other  subsector  are distributed  in
approximately  equal  shares  between  positive  and  negative  NNPRs.  On a product-
wise  basis  (cf.  Annex  4),  it is important  to remark  that subsectors  producit.,
intermediates  and inputs  for  other  subsectors  (heavy  chemicals,  synthetic
yarns,  basic  steel  products)  show  quite  higher  NPRs  and  CNPRs (averaging  about- 1U  -
62%) than the other subsectors producing final goods which have NPRs and CNPRs
averaging about 32%.
26.  It should be noted that the average actual NPRs and CNPRs, of 35% and
45% respectively, are substantially lower than the average tariff collection
rates of 60-70% for 1987/88, which in turn are much lower than the average
official customs tariffs of 130-140% (cf. £1]).  The levels of customs tariffs
and collection rates have been often exceeding those required by protection
purposes only; the substantial amount of "water" in tariffs may result from
the ad-hocism of protection policies  (cf.  para. 23) or possibly from the
objective of generating public revenue. The benefits eventually derived from
such public revenue are more than offset by the adverse effects of this non-
protection objective on the structure and levels of manufacturing production
costs, and have largely contributed to building-up the "high-cost economy"
which India and its consumers have to live with.
27.  The significant levels of Net protection (both nominal and effective)
are reflected by the differences between the financial (pre-tax) and economic
rates of return of t1n projects  (MRR and ERR respectively). Some three-fourths
of projects have finaaicial  rates of return lower than ERRs.  The sign identity
of MRR-ERR and NEPR according  t; the CEPR model (cf. para. 7 of AnneK 1) is
verified in 84% of the cases, which confirms the relevance of the CEPR model
to the analysis (the sign equivalence is statisticall.y  significant).  The
actual relationships between MRR-ERR and NEPR are displayed on Graph 4 where
most observations are in the lower left quadrant. Furthermore, most
observations are outside the shaded area of NEPRs within the + 20% range
which, as observed in para. 15, denotes a balanced and equitable structure of
protection rates for output, inputs and capital goods leaving practically no
room for extra-profit nor x-inefficiencies.
GRAPH  4
RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  EPRs AND IRRs
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Illustration  of  the  quantity  effects  of x-inefficiencies
28.  In  view  of the  significant  levels  of NEPR  available  to some  of the
synthetic  fibers  and  heavy  chemicals  industries  in  India  (Cf.  para.  22),  the
question  arises  whether  Indian  planners  may  have tried  to estimate  product-
specific  protection  rates  to cover  not  only the  price  effects  of NPCk  but also
the  quantity  effects  of x-Lnefficiencies  (the  choice  of uneconomic  capacity
sizes  below  the  MES  required  for international  competitiveness  in subsectors
/product  groups  characterized  by significant  economies  of scale;  and/or  the
unability,  for  market  or technical  reasons,  to reach  a satisfactory  rate  of
capacity  utilization)  stemming  from  India's  self-sufficiency  and licensing
policies.  The  primacy  of self-sufficiency  in  Indian  industrial  policy  has
generated  protection  policies  which  permitted  the  financial  viability  of
markedly  undersized  plants  satisfying  small,  or very small,  domestic  markets.
In  addition,  the  traditional  regulations  for  licensing  of entry  and  domestic
competition  have limited  in  each  product  group  the  output  of each  plant  to a
prescribed  share  of the  market,  and thus  constrained  the  capacity  utilization
of new  entrants. As mentioned  in  para.  16,  these  factors  can  distort  upwards
the  unit investment  costs.  It is shown  in  Annex  1 that,  similarly  to the  price
effects  of the  factor  NPCk,  the  quantity  effects  of x-inefficiencies  on
financial  profitability correspond  to  an effective  protection  rate  providing
international  level  returns,  denominated  XEPR  and  computed  as follows:
XEPR - (1 - s).(x - 1),  where the factor x is inversely related to
the  capacity  utilization  rate  k and  the
ratio  of capacity  size  to  MES.
Moreover,  Annex 1  shows  that,  for  the  actual  EPR  to cover  both the  price
and quantity  effects,  then  NEPR should  be  greater  than  XEPR.
29.  Typical  industries  characterized  by significant  economies  of scale  are
those  producing  synthetic  fibers  and  chemicals,  particularly  petro-chemicals.
Project-specific  data  on some  of these  products  from  the  sample,  as shown  in
Table  4, indicate  the  presence  of uneconomic  capacities,  sometimes  coupled
with low  capacity  rates.  The  table  shows  that  NEPR is  higher  than  XEPR in 4
cases,  and lower  in  5 cases.  This  tends  to invalidate  the  assumption,  raised
in  para.  28,  that  the  levels  of actual  protection  granted  to such  products
could  have  been estimated  to cover  both  the  price  and  quantity  effects  of
policies  for capital  goods  protection,  self-sufficiency  and licensing.
TABLE  4:  X-INEFFICIENCY  EFFECTS  ON EFFECTIVE  PROTECTION
Product  MES/Capacity  Capacity  Factor  x  CEPR  NEPR  XEPR
Ratio  Utiln(%)  ------ (in  %)-----
EPM  Rubber  2.000  90  1.320  32  89  26
ABS  5.000  75  2.284  12  74  35
SBR  2.414  90  1.423  41  102  35
PFY  1.667  81  1.364  35  54  28
MA  1.429  70  1.483  33  28  41
NBR  4.167  85  1.874  43  25  75
NTY  1.456  87  1.201  58  -5  18
POY  5.556  90  1.986  70  20  86
Alpha  Olefins  2.000  85  1.397  37  -12  36- 13 -
Conclusions
30.  Another  Bank  review  of India's  industrial  sector  had also  found
effective  protection  rates to  average  about  40%  over the  sector,  with
substantial  inter-sectoral  variations.  This is  confirmed  (within  the error
margin  of +  10%)  by the  analysis  presented  herein.  Moreover,  the  use of
Corrected  Effective  Protection  (CEPR)  shows  that,  on  average,  the amount  of
effective  protection  available  from  the  structure  of protection  in India  is
just sufficient  to compensate  for  the  high  costs  of investment  resulting  from
the  high  protection  granted  to the  capital  goods  subsector.  The real incentive
granted  by the  protection  structure  (taking  into  account  the  price  of capital
goods)  does  not appear  to be the traditional  EPR  but the  Net  Effective
Protection  rate (NEPR),  the difference  between  EPR and  CEPR.  Inter-sectoral
variations  of NEPR  are revealed  to  be larger  than  those  of the  EPR itself,  and
a majority  of projects  are in fact  subject  to negative  CEPRs  and thus  in a
disadvantaged  position  compared  to foreign  competitors.
31.  The  more general  finding  is  that  the  traditional  measure  of effective
protection  based  on gross  Value  Added,  by focussing  only  on the  price  ratios
of output  and current  inputs  and thus  neglecting  the  price  ratio  of fixed
capital,  does  not fully  reflect  the incentives  provided  by the  structure  of
protection.  In those  cases  where  misguided  policies  distort  the  domestic  price
of capital  goods  substantially  away  from international  prices  (either  above  as
in India,  or possibly  below in  the  case  of investment  subsidies),  a more
meaningful  indicator  of the incentives  to industry  would  be the  Net  Effective
Protection  as defined  htrein.  In such  cases,  a reform  of the  trade  and  protec-
tion  policies  towards  lower  protection  rates  would  be meaningless,  or even
damaging,  without  first  lowering  the  protection  on capital  goods.  When war-
ranted,  the  nominal  protection  rate  for  capital  goods  should  be slashed  down
to the  lowest  possible  level  above  the  shadow  premium  for  foreign  exchange.
32.  Finally,  a  word of caution.  Corrected  Effective  Protection  should  not be
viewed  as a normative  tool  by industrial/trade  policy  makers  to compute  how
much additional  effective  protection  could  be granted  on a case-by-case  basis
to adjust  for the  effects  of x-inefficiencies  or high investment  cost  poli-
cies.  This  paper  and  the  notions  of CEPR  and  NEPR  were  developed  for
industrial/trade  analysts  and  practitioners,  and  were  not  meant  to address
normative  issues  nor the  welfare  implications  of general-  or partial-
equilibrium  EPRs (e.g.,  welfare-raising  effects  of compensation  for specific
industries  in  a second-best  sense,  the  structure  of an optimal  distribution  of
NEPRs as compared to the case of free trade, ... ).  Corrected Effective
Protection  should  be viewed  only  as a pragmatic  tool (which  requires  for
computation  only standard  information  readily  available  in  ERR  and FRR
estimates)  to assess  the damage  caused  by policies  leading  to  high investment
costs  and  high  protection  of the  capital  goods  industry,  and should  be used to
assess  only the  level  of taxation  and  protection  of capital  goods  beyond  which
the  associated  damage  becomes  counter-productive  or intolerable  for interna-
tional  competitiveness.  Similarly,  the  notion  of XEPR,  measuring  the  quantity
effects  of x-inefficiencies,  is another  practical  tool  to assess  the damages
of protection  policies  permitting  inefficient  choice  or  operation  of capacity.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  RETURNS  UNDER  PROTECTION
DEFINITION  AND COMPUTATION  OF CORRECTED  PROTECTION
1.  Consider  as the  reference  comparator  an industrial  project  operating
under  a free-trade  regime  to produce  a tradeable  and  consume  tradeebles  and
non-tradeables  during  a period  of N years.  Per  unit of output,  the  project
would  require  an investment  Iw  and  generate  under  permanent  operating
conditions  an annual  gross  value  added  VAw (both  Iw and  VAw  being  expressed  at
international  prices).  The  project's  annual  cash  flov  would  be CFw  - VAw - Lw
,  where  Lw is the  total  cost  of the  Labor  factor.
2.  Consider  the  same  project  implemented  and  operating  under  a protection
structure  different  from  free-trade.  The  project  would  then  require  an invest-
ment  Id and  would  generate  an annual  Value  Added  VAd (both  Id  and  VAd  being
expressed  in the  domestic  prices  resulting  from  the  protection  structure).  The
project's annual cash flow would be:  CFd - VAd - Ld - T ,  where:
. Ld,  the  annual  cost of Labor,  is  assumed  to  be marginally  different
from Lw (which  is  reasonable  at least  in  the short  term),  and  thus to  be
expressed  in the  form  Ld - (l+m).Lw  ,  with  m small;  and
. T. the  tax (on  profit)  paid  by the  project  under  protection,  is  the
additional  tax  above  that  it  would  pay  under  the free-trade  regime.
3.  Introducing  the  following  notations:
y  - Id/lw  (ratio  of unit investment  costs  in domestic/world  prices);
s - Lw/VAw  (share  of Labor  in  VAw  under  free-trade  regime);
t  - T/VAw  (share  of the  additional  profit  tax in  VAw);
EPR - (VAd - VAw)/VAw ,  the Effective Protection Rate; and
AR - CF/I - 1/N ,  the annual return (after depreciation) to investment;
then simple  algebraic  manipulation  establishes  the  following  relationship
between  the simple  annual  returns  to investment  under  both  situations:
ARd /  ARw - l/y . (1  + (EPR - m.s - t)/(l-s)]  (1)
4.  It should  be noted  that  factor  "y"  represents  the  ratio  of investment
costs  per  unit (of  output).  It can  be expressed  thus  as the  product  of two
factors:  y - z.z  ,  where  factor  z captures  the  price  effects  of pricing
policies  for  investment  and capital  goods  under  the  conaidered  protection
regime,  and factor  x  captures  the  quantity  effects  of x-inefficiencies  in
selecting  and operating  the  project's  production  capacity  (capacity
utilisation  rate,  plant  size  relative  to  MES....).  If the  reference  comparator
for  the  project  is a foreign  competitor  operating  under  international  prices
and standards  of efficiency,  both  factors  should  be preferably  taken  into
account.  If  the  reference  comparator  is  the  same  project  in the  same  country
after  an  hypothetical  reform  to free-trade,  then  the  effects  of price  factor  z
can  be analyzed  separately  from  those  of factor  x.5.  The above  relationship  between  simple  returns  to investment  leads  to  a
similar  relationship  involving  the  profit  returns  to equity.  Under  the
assumptions  adopted  for  comparison,  the  project  in  both situations  is financed
with a constant  debt/equity  ratio.  The  debt  generates  thus  an interest  charge
FK which  is in  a fixed  proportion  to the  investment  cost,  i.e.  FK/I  is
constant  in  both  price  systems  (domestic  and international).  Given  that  the
Profit P is by definition equal to AR  - FK ,  it follows that:
Pd - Pw - ARd - ARw - ARw/y . [1 - y +(EPR - m.s - t)/(l-s)]  (2)
6.  Equations  (1)  and (2)  can  also  be used to derived  a relationship  between
the  project's  Internal  Rates  of Return  (IRR)  achieved  under the  two  alterna-
tive  trade  regimes.  To permit  algebraic  manipulations,  each IRR  is  computed
for  an elementary  model  of project  cash  flow:  the investment  I is implemented
in one  year,  and  reaches  in its  first  year  of operation  its  full  capacity,
thus  generating  the  constant  annual  cash  flow  CF during  the  N years  of project
life.  When the  ratio  CF/I is  relatively  small  (below  0.3,  which  is the  case  of
most industrial  projects),  IRR is  well approximated  by the  following  formula:
IRR  = CF/I - lI[N.(l  + (N-1).CF/2 I)]
Applying  twice  this  formula  to the  project  yields  the  following  relationship
between  IRRd  under  protection  and IRRw  under  free-trade  for  the  project:
IRRd - IRRw - C . l/y . (1 -y +(EPR - m.s - t)/(l-s)]  (3)
where  C is  a constant  specific  of the  project's  parameters  under  free-trade. 1
7.  The  three  formulas  above  are  similar  in  nature.  For each  of them,  the
requirement  that the  return  under  protection  be at least  equal  to the  retuarn
under  free-trade  is translated,  by simple  algebra,  into  the  condition 2:
EPR >. (y - 1).(1 - s) + m.s + t =  CEPR  (4)
The  right  part of the  above  equation  is called  the  Corrected  Effective
Protection  Rate. It is  the  minimum  amount  of effective  protection  just
sufficient  to compensate  for  the  higher  amount  of investment  (y  > 1)  and  earn
the  return  on investment  achievable  under  free-trade  if operating  efficiently.
The  difference EPR - CEPR  - NEPR  is  called  the  Net  Effective  Protection
rate;  it  measures  the  additional  effective  protection  available  above  CEPR,
and  thus  the  room for  extra-profit  or operating  inefficiency.
8.  The  level  of nominal  protection  of output  required  for  yielding  an
effective  protection  at least  equal  to CEPR  is derived  from the  definition  of
EPR - NPRi + (NPRo - NPRi)/a ,  where "a" is the VA/Output ratio in
international  prices,  and  NPRs  are  nominal  protection  rates  for  output/inputs.
The  requirement EPR  >-  CEPR translates  readily  into:
1  2
Specifically,  C - (CFw/Iw)  . (1  +  (N-1)/[2N.(l+(CFw/Iw).(N-1)/2)]]
2  The same  algebra  applied  to formula  (3)  shows  also that  EPR  >  CEPR
(resp. <  )  is equivalent to IRRd >  IRRw (resp. < ).NPRo >-  a.CEPR + (1 - a).NPRi - CNPRo
where the right part of the equation is called the Corrected Nominal
Protection Rate for output.
9.  Two remarks about equation (4) are warranted. First, the terms "ml"  and
"t" are small parameters of the first order of magnitude. In fact, taxation
practices and levels are generally similar across countries in order to
attract or retain investments. It is reasonable to expect that T of para. 2
above will be small in most cases where the actual level of EPR above CEPR
does not provide room for extra-profit which Government coul.d  appropriate
partly through extra-taxation T. Thus, whenever EPR-CEPR is small, it is
legitimate to discard parameter "t". Also, "i" the percentage of variation
from Lw to Ld in the simulated shift from protection to free-trade is
generally expected in most cases to  be relatively limited, at least in the
short/medium-term. Moreover, the quantity m.s is of the second order of
magnitude for "s" small. For these reasons, formula (4) can be reduced to its
first term, at least in those cases when the parameter "s" is small (say below
25X). Consequently, the formula defining the CEPR will be simplified in first
approximation to:
CEPR - (1 - s).(y - 1)  (5),  whenever "s" is small.
10.  As noted in para.4, the parameter "y" is the product of two factors,
one capturing the quantity effects of x-inefficiency and the other capturing
the price effects of pricing and protection policies for investment and capi-
tal goods (cf. para.12 below). When the effects of such pricing policies on a
project's effective protection are analyzed, the project under protection is
to  be compared to the same project under free-trade regime, and the factor "y"
reduced to the price factor. In particular, under protection structures
characterized by a nominal protection coefficient NPCk for capital goods which
is significantly above 1, the CEPR formula can be rewritten:
CEPR - (1 - s).(NPCk - 1)  (6),
which is the formula used in the main text.
11.  This formula can be demonstrated
geometrically in the case of the simple  Prices  E
model of para.3. In the adjacent graph,  D.  *  D
the capital remuneration Pd+FKd for  ,  .-
CEPR is proportionate to the investment  --  *'.-  4B  Pd-
cost and thus to NPCk, and labor cost L  . - - -- |
is assumed constant. By projection of  H  .. - - l  .A
segment FG into segment AB,  and segment  ,.  *,
GH into segments BC and DE, on the  P  .-  -FK,
vertical line NPCk, VAd - (Pd+FKd)+L - .'.-  F
AD+DE - AE (where DE-HG-CB- L).  - - '  .
Hence: CEPR - (AE-FH)/FH - (AE-AC)/FH  .'.  - .
(where  AC-FH)  - ((AE-ED)-(AC-CB)]/FH  .. :  - -
(AD-AB)/FH - (AD-AB)/FG. FG/FH - -
(NPCk-1).FG/FG.(l-s) - (NPCk-1).(l-s).  0  NPCi  NPCo  NPCk12.  By  definition,  "y"  is  the  ratio  of investment  costs  Id  and  Iw  ,Rer  unit
of  output.  These  unit  investment  costs  are  thus  expressed  by:
Id - TId/Qd ,  and Iw  - TIw/Qw ,  where  TId  and TIw are the total
investment  costs  in  domestic  and  international  prices  respectively,  and  Qd  and
Qw  are  the  corresponding  levels  of  output  production.
The  total  investment  costs  are  such  Lhat: TId  - NPCk.TIw  ,  by
definition  of  the  average  coefficient  of  nominal  protection  NPCk  which
captures  the  price  effect  of  pricing  and  protection  policies  for  investment
and  capital  goods.
Output  production  Q is  also  expressed  by:  Q - K.k ,  w' *e  K is  the
production  capacity  and  k is  the  capacity  utilization  rate.  )r he sake  of
simplicity,  it  is  assumed  that  the  utilization  rate  kv  of the .- ference
comparator  operating  efficiently  under  a  free-trade  regime  is  90%,  and  the
utilization  rate  kd  of the  project  under  protection  is  defined  relatively  to
the  above  level.  The  ratio  kd/kw  - kd/0.9  is  herein  denominated  "k".
Most  chemical  industries,  and  generally  the  fluid-processing  industries.
are  characterized  by a  pragmatic  law  which,  ceteris  paribus,  relates  in  first
approximation  the  total  investment  cost  of  a  project  to  its  capacity:
0.6
TI - Constante.  K  ,  where  K is  to  the  power  0.6.
By  simple  algebraic  manipulation,  it  follows  that:
0.4
y - Id/Iw  - NPCk . (1/k) . (Kw/Kd)  D  NPCk.x ,  where:
- Kw the  capacity  of the  reference  comparator  is  normally  equal  or
greater  than  the  relevant  Minimum  Economic  Scale  (MES);  and
0.4
- factor  x - (l/k).(MES/Kd)  captures  the  quantity  effects  of  the  x-
inefficiencies  generated  or tolerated  by  the  protection  policies.
13.  Three  specific  thresholds  of  effective  protection  can  be derived  from
the  above  developments.  First,  CEPR  - (1  - s).(NPCk  - 1)  is  the  level  of EPR
required  to  compensate  for  the  taxation  of the  investment  cost  due  to  NPCk
(the  price  effect).  Second,  the  threshold  (1  - s).(x  - 1)  associated  to  the  x
factor  estimates  the  level  of  EPR  associated  implicitely  to  the  x-inefficien-
cies  generated  or  tolerated  ty the  protection  and  licensing  policies;  by
reference  to the x-inefficiencies,  it is denominated  XEPR - (l - s).(x - 1).
Finally,  the  threshold  of EPR  associated  to  the  combined  price  and  quantity
effects,  through  factor  y - NPCk.x ,  is denominated  TEPR - (1 - s).(y - 1).
These  three  concepts  are  not  independant,  and  are  linked  by a  relation
of  quasi-additivity:
TEPR - CEPR +  XEPR  +  CEPR.XEPR/(1  - s)
An  actual  EPR  meant  to  cover  both  the  price  and  quantity  effects  would
be at  least  equal  to  TEPR;  hence,  NEPR  vould  be at least  equal  to the  sum  of
the  last  two  terms  in  the  formula  above,  and  strictly  _reater  than  XEPR.ANNEX 2
BASIC PAPLMETERS  OF SAMPLE  PROJECTS
Subsector(Product)  Investmt  ICOR  VAw  Labor  Factor  Factor  Factor
___________________  Cost(Wp)  -------  -------  Cost  Ps"  NPCkl  NPCk2
Rs crores  Rs croresRs  crores
Heavy Chemicalst
Phenols(60/61)  2.12  2.33  0.91  0.09  0.099  1.38  1.4
Buta Rubber(67)  17.85  3.49  5.11  0.72  0.141  1.5  1.
EPH Rubber(67)  32.03  5.33  6.01  1.21  0.201  1.4  1.4
ABS(67)  10.74  4.08  2.63  0.87  0.331  1.42  1.4
Alpha Olephins(67)  61.92  2.64  23.46  2.21  0.094  1.41  1.7
SBR(67)  46.69  5.29  8.82  1.52  0.172  1.5  1.6
Nitric  Acid(60/61)  4.2  1.74  2.42  0.32  0.132  1.53  1.6
PA(61/67)  52.31  2.53  20.67  .1...' 0.073  1.04  1.16
MA(61/67)  15.48  2.09  7.39  0.65  0.088  1.435  1.59
MA(61167)  15.26  3.70  4.12  0.63  0.153  1.39  1.62
AVERAGE (weighted)  258.6  3.17  81.54  9.72  0.119  1.36  1.53
Average (plain)  3.32  19.72  0.15
10  10  10  10
Synthetic  Textiles:
PFY(45)  109.08  3.23  33.78  3.53  0.104  1.45  1.65
POY(45)  15.62  2.94  5.31  0.65  0.122  1.79  1.81
NTY(45)  64.86  3.18  20.41  2.62  0.128  1.66  1.66
Synthetic  Yarn(45)  8.11  1.82  4.45  0.85  0.191  1.33  1.53
AVERAGE (weighted)  197.67  3.09  63.95  7.65  0.120  1.54  1.66
Average (plain)  2.79  15.4Z  0.14
4  4  4  4
Basic Steel Products:
Spec.Steel  Castgs(73/74)  5.37  1.20  4.48  0.53  0.118  0  1.63
Forgings(73/74)  5.05  1.87  2.7  0.54  0.200  0  1.505
ColdRoll  Coils(73/74)  20.12  4.73  4.25  0.58  0.136  0  1.55
Steel  Tubes(73/74)  9.23  2.94  3.14  0.47  0.150  0  1.65
Iron  Pipes(73/74)  4.96  0.86  5.8  0.8  0.138  1.51  1.71
Coated SteelSheets(73/74)  20.74  3.32  6.25  1.4  0.224  1.44.  1.59
Forgings(73/74)  3.03  2.15  1.41  0.9  0.638  1.53  1.575
AVERAGE (weighted)  68.5  2.44  28.03  5.22  0.186  1.46  1.59
Average (plain)  2.44  6.8Z  0.23
7  7  7  7
Electronics:
TV Loudspeakers(90)  2.11  4.80  0.44  0.11  0.250  1.2  1.4
Audio Systems(90)  2.36  1.77  1.33  0.3  0.226  1.42  1.51
Single-sided  PCBS(90)  2.23  3.19  0.7  0.2  0.286  1.24  1.48
Step  Motors(90)  5.08  2.45  2.07  0.6  0.290  1.33  1.38
B&W  and Color TVs(90)  4.32  0.83  5.21  1.49  0.286  1.38  1.55
Electronic  Tuners(90)  3.73  6.78  0.55  0.2  0.364  1.26  1.39
EPABXs(88)  9.04  1.75  5.16  1.55  0.300  1.22  1.33
Computer  Terminals(90)  3.93  1.81  2.17  0.68  0.313  1.39  1.53
PCs(90)  21  1.62  12.97  2.09  0.161  1.23  0
Mainframes&Software(90)  11.24  0.57  19.59  5.31  0.271  1.18  1.29
'loppies(!OOZEOU)(90)  2.29  1.64  1.4  0.44  0.314  1.04  1.09
…__________________  ------
AVERAGE (weighted)  67.33  1.31  51.59  12.97  0.251  1.25  1.38
Average (plain)  2.47  12.4Z  0.28
11  11  11  11Food  Industriest
;oybean  011(36)  14.26  3.33  4.28  1.11  0.259  0  1.49
Glucose(38)  14.41  1.51  8.97  1.55  0.173  0  1.52
Glucose(38)  13.38  1.33  10.03  0.91  0.091  1.32  1.49
Vartillin(38)  4.08  4.86  0.84  0.21  0.250  1.5  0
AVERAGE (weighted)  46.13  1.91  24.12  3.78  0.157  1.36  1.50
Average (plain)  2.78  5.82  0.19
4  4  4  4
Miscellaneous  Industries:
Paper(52)  9.93  3.45  2.88  0.6  0.208  0  1.58
res(56)  197.78  4.49  44.03  8.8  0.200  1.415  0
PP Film(57)  5.07  3.25  1.56  0.51  0.327  1.49  1.58
PVC Tiles(57)  4.35  1.04  4.18  1.06  0.254  0  1.5
Plastic  Profiles(57)  3.27  2.92  1.12  0.29  0.259  1.4  1.42
AVERAGE (weighted)  220.4  4.10  53.77  11.26  0.209  1.42  1.54
Average (plain)  3.03  13.0Z  0.25
5  5  5  5
Light Chemicals
Pesticides(63)  6.46  0.99  6.52  1.43  0.219  1.39  1.5
Na Ampicillin(Drug)(65)  0.58  0.73  0.8  0.05  0.063  1.3  1.71
Magnetic Oxides(68)  12.32  2.52  4.88  0.81  0.166  1.3  1.5
AVERAGE (weighted)  19.36  1.59  12.2  2.29  0.188  1.33  1.51
.erage (plain)  1.41  2.9Z  0.15
3  3  3  3
ther  Engineering  Industries:
luminum  Extrusions(75)  2.7  0.52  5.23  0.68  0.130.  0  1.6
luminum  Foil(75)  2,57  1.08  2.37  0.48  0.203  1.43  1.58
earings(77)  27.16  2.42  11.22  0.4  0.036  1.51  1.51
Machine-Tools(81)  7.76  1.72  4.52  0.69  0.153  1.4  1.54
ower  Handtools(84)  11.39  1.21  9.42  1.9  0.202  1.39  1.85
XLPE Cables(85)  4.94  0.45  10.86  1.24  0.114  1.85  1.9
Jelly  Filled Cables(85)  12.63  1.73  7.29  2.32  0.318  1.4  1.66
Batteries(86)  12.58  1.48  8.51  1.85  0.217  0  1.84
Fluoresc.  Lamps(87)  27.1  2.52  10.74  0.81  0.075  1.45  1.6
Washing  Machines(87)  14.53  1.53  9.48  2.2  0.232  1.31  1.46
Auto Electricals(93)  7  2.29  3.06  0.77  0.252  1.52  1.55
Carburettors(93)  7.47  0.95  7.84  1.85  0.236  1.48  1.61
Bus Bodies(93)  12.26  1.70  7.2  1.18  0.164  1.43  0
2-W Shock  Absorbers(94)  3.4  1.86  1.83  0.88  0.481  1.25  1.45
AVERAGE (weighted)  153.49  1.54  99.57  17.25  0.173  1.45  1.62
Average (plain)  1.53  24.02  0.20
14  14  14  14
OVERALL  AVERAGE(weightd)  1031.48  2.49  414.77  70.14  0.169  1.42  1.57
OVERALL  AVERAGE(plain)  100.0Z  2.43  100.0*  0.21
Sample size  58  58  58
Intermediates/Inputs
AVERAGE(weightd)  745.17  3.28  227.29  33.85  0.149  1.43  1.59
AVERAGE(plain)  72.22  2.95  54.8Z  0.19
Sample  size  26  26  26
Final  Goods
AVERAGE(weightd)  286.31  1.53  187.48  36.29  0.194  1.38  1.54
AVERAGE(plain)  27.81  2.00  45.22  0.22
Sample  size  32  32  32ANNEX 3
IMPACT  OF INVESTMENT  COSTS ON VALUE  ADDED  AND EPRs, BY SUBSECTORO
-------------------------- _-----------------------------------
Subsector(Product)VDuties(Z)  Factor  Factor  CEPR1  CEPR2  Actual EPR  NEPR2  NEPR1
-------  ------ (On  Imprtd  NPCkl  NPCk2  -----  -----  ----------  -- _-  __-_-_
KalGoods  ------  ------
Heavy Chemicals.
Phenols(60/61)  *  1.38  1.42  25  27  153  126  128
Buta Rubber(67)  *  134  1.5  1.5  43  43  68  25  25
EPM Rubber(67)  *  136  1.4  1.44  32  35  121  86  89
ABS(67)  *  82  1.42  1.47  11  13  86  73  75
Alpha OlephiLs(67)*  90  1.41  1.76  37  69  25  -44  -12
SLR(67)  *  84  1.5  1.69  41  57  143  86  102
Nitric  Acid(60/61)*  91  1.53  1.62  46  54  -28  -82  -74
PA(61/67)  *  0  1.04  1.16  3  15  -10  -25  -13
W.(61167)  *  94  1.435  1.59  40  53  -32  -85  -72
MA(61/67)  *  98  1.39  1.62  33  53  61  8  28
__________________  -------  -----  -----  ---  _____-_____-_-___-_  _
AVERAGE (weighted)*  28.19  44.90  37.14  -7.76  8.95
Average (plain)  89.89  1.40  1.53  31.10  41.90  58.70  16.80  27.60
9  10  10  10  10  10  10  10
Synthetic  Textiles:
PFY(45)  *  89  1.45  1.65  35  50  89  39  54
POY(45)  *  90  1.79  1.81  69  71  90  19  21
NTY(45)  *  84  1.66  1.66  58  58  53  -5  -5
Synthetic  Yarn(45)*  1.33  1.53  23  37  -20  -57  -43
__________________  -------  -----  _________---  -----  -----  _-
AVERAGE (weighted)*  44.33  53.39  70.01  16.62  25.68
Average (plain)  87.67  1.56  1.66  46.25  54.00  53.00  -1.00  6.75
3  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Basic Steel  Products:
Spec.Steel  Castgs(*  86  1.63  55  -26  -81
Forgings(73/74)  *  38  1.505  37  26  -11
ColdRoll  Coils(73/*  1.55  48  174  126
Steel Tubes(73/74)*  86  1.65  56  70  14
Iron Pipes(73/74)  *  110  1.51  1.71  44  61  -10  -71  -54
Coated  SteelSheets*  90  1.44  1.59  34  46  93  47  59
Forgings(73/74)  *  63  1.53  1.575  19  21  176  155  157
__________________  -------  -----  -----  ___  ____---  -----  - - -
AVERAGE (weighted)*  36.74  49.84  60.09  10.25  20.57
Average (plain)  78.83  1.49  1.60  32.33  46.29  71.86  25.57  54.00
6  3  7  3  7  7  7  3
Electronics:
TV Loudspeakers(90*  36  1.2  1.4  14  27  120  93  106
Audio Systems(90)  *  42  1.42  1.51  32  39  45  6  13
Single-sided  PCBS(*  42  1.24  1.48  14  28  159  131  145
Step  Motors(90)  *  47  1.33  1.38  22  25  31  6  9
B5W and Color TVs(*  44  1.38  1.55  14  20  82  62  68
Electronic  Tuners(*  44  1.26  1.39  -3  -5  287  292  290
EPABXs(88)  *  31  1.22  1.33  15  23  13  -10  -2
omputer  Terminals*  45  1.39  1.53  27  35  19  -16  -8
Cs(90)  *  39  1.23  12  6  -6
Ma.tnframes&Softwar*  30  1.18  1.29  13  21  -35  -56  -48
Floppies(1002EOU)(*  0  1.04  1.09  3  6  0  -6  -3
AVERAGE (weighted)*  14.07  22.03  7.24  -14.37  -6.83
Average (plain)  36.36  1.26  1.40  14.82  21.90  66.09  50.20  51.27
11  11  10  11  10  11  10  11Food  Industriess
Soybean  Oil(36)  *  60  1.49  36  115  79
Glucose(38)  *  90  1.52  43  -18  -61
Glucose(38)  *  93  1.32  1.49  29  45  -26  -71  -55
Vanillin(38)  *  1.5  38  131  99
_________________-  -------  -----  -----  ---  -----  __  __  _  ____  _  ------
AVERAGE  (weighted)*  29.70  42.57  7.67  -39.57  -43.10
Average  (plain)  81.00  1.41  1.50  33.50  41.33  52.00  -17.67  22.00
3  2  3  2  3  4  3  2
Miscellaneous  Industriest
Paper(52)  *  86  1.58  46  75  29
Tyres(56)  *  88  1.415  33  83  50
BOPP  Film(57)  *  89  1.49  1.58  33  39  79  40  46
PVC  Tiles(57)  *  71  1.5  38  19  -19
Plastic  Profiles(S*  40  1.4  1.42  29  31  51  20  22
AVERAGE  (weighted)*  32.90  39.72  76.81  9.13  49.20
Average  (plain)  74.80  1.44  1.52  31.67  38.50  61.40  17.50  39.33
5  3  4  3  4  5  4  3
Light  Chemicals
Pesticides(63)  *  1.39  1.5  31  39  -29  -68  -60
Na  Ampicillin(Drug*  1.3  1.71  28  66  -13  -79  -41
Magnetic  Oxides(68*  59  1.3  1.5  25  42  25  -17  0
AVERAGE  (weighted)*  28.40  41.97  -6.35  -48.32  -34.75
Average  (plain)  59.00  1.33  1.57  28.00  49.00  -5.67  -54.67  -33.67
1  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Other  Engineering  Industries:
Aluminum  Extrus' s*  37  1.6  52  -58  -110
Aluminum  Poil(7  *  81  1.43  1.50  34  46  -33  -79  -67
Bearings(77)  *  54  1.51  1.51  49  49  -14  -63  -63
Machine-Tools(81)  *  95  1.4  1.54  34  46  -21  -b7  -55
Power  Handtools(84*  90  1.39  1.85  31  68  -23  -91  -54
XLPE  Cables(85)  *  95  1.85  1.9  76  80  -34  -114  -110
Jelly  Filled  Cable*  86  1.4  1.66  27  45  15  -30  -12
Batteries(86)  *  90  1.84  66  -15  -81
Fluoresc.  Lamps(87*  80  1.45  1.6  4^  56  27  -29  -15
Washing  Machines(8*  47  1.31  1.46  24  35  -9  -44  -33
Auto  Electricals(9*  92  1.52  1.55  39  41  34  -7  .5
Carburettors(93)  *  68  1.48  1.61  37  46  -23  -69  -60
Bus  Bodies(93)  *  1.43  36  -23  -59
2-W  Shock  Absorber*  61  1.25  1.45  13  23  17  -6  4
AVERAGE  (weighted)*  40.42  54.12  -12.49  -65.79  -49.89
Average  (plain)  75.08  1.45  1.63  36.83  50.23  -11.43  -60.77  -44.08
13  12  13  12  13  14  13  12
OVERALL  AVERAGE  1we*  32.85  46.36  30.28  -20.98  -1  58
OVERALL  AVERAGE(pla  70.53  1.40  1.55  30.08  41.78  40.81  -1.70  11.69
Sample  size  51  48  54  48  54  58  54  48ANNE
IMPACT OF  INPUT AND INVESTMENT COSTS ON COMPETITIVENESS AND NPRs,BY SUBSECTOR
Product  Olnput Cost  VA Impact From  CNPR1  CNPR2  Actual NPR  NNPR2  NN
-------  ( Impact  CEPR1  CEPR2  ------  ------  ----------  -
(-------  ---- in 2 of Output Value at International Prices ---------
Heavy Chemicals:
Phenols(60/61)  *  41  3  4  44  45  64  19
Buta Rubber(67)  *  52  16  16  68  68  77  9
EPH Rubber(67)  *  34  9  10  43  44  67  23
ABS(67)  *  51  3  4  54  55  77  22
Alpha Olephins(67)*  68  14  27  82  95  77  -18
SBR(67)  *  52  8  11  60  63  77  14
Nitric Acid(60/61)*  34  32  38  66  72  14  -58
PA(61/67)  *  30  2  7  32  37  25  -12
MA(61/67)  *  15  17  23  32  38  0  -38
MH(61/67)  *  32  15  25  47  57  61  4
AVERAGE  (weighted)*  46.35  10.03  16.08  56.38  62.42  58.80  -3.63  2.4
Average  (plain)  40.90  11.90  16.50  52.80  57.40  53.90  -3.50  1
10  10  10  10  10  10  10
Synthetic Textiles:
PFY(45)  *  45  16  23  61  68  67  -1
POY(45)  *  50  18  18  68  68  76  8
NTY(45)  *  50  20  20  70  70  68  -2
Synthetic Yarn(45)*  27  8  12  34  39  20  -19
AVIERAGE  (weighted)*  46.03  17.07  20.44  63.02  66.48  64.87  -1.61  1
Average  (plain)  43.00  15.50  18.25  58.25  61.25  57.75  -3.50  -0
4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Basic Steel Products:
Spec.Steel Castgs(*  57  17  75  49  -26
Forgings(73/74)  *  43  15  58  54  -4
ColdRoll Coils(73/*  43  8  51  72  21
Steel  Tubes(73/74)*  22  22  44  49  5
Iron  Pipes(73/74)  *  29  20  28  49  57  25  -32
Coated SteelSheets*  59  4  5  63  64  68  4
Forginys(73/74)  *  52  4  4  56  56  83  27
AVERAGE  (weighted)*  49.65  6.48  10.38  60.16  60.14  61.82  1.69  2.
Average  (plain)  43.57  9.33  14.14  56.00  57.86  57.14  -0.71  2.
7  3  7  3  7  7  7
Electronics:
TV Loudspeakers(90*  2  3  6  5  8  30  22
Audio  Systems(90) *  43  7  9  50  52  54  2
Single-sided PCBS(*  36  3  6  39  42  71  29
Step Motors(90)  *  45  8  9  53  54  56  2
B&W and Color TVs(*  60  2  2  62  62  68  6
Electronic Tuners(*  54  -1  0  53  54  95  41
EPABXs(88)  *  14  7  10  21  24  20  -4
Computer Terminals*  51  7  9  58  60  56  -4
PCs(90)  *  18  2  20  19
Mainframes&Softwar*  12  8  13  20  25  -8  -33  -28
Floppies(IOOZEOU)(*  0  1  2  1  2  0  -2
AVERAGE (weighted)*  30.48  3.24  5.57  33.72  43.26  32.23  -3.39  -1.49
Average (plain)  30.45  4.27  6.60  34.73  38.30  41.91  5.90  7.18
11  11  10  11  10  11  10  11Food Industriess
Soybean Oil(36)  *  37  4  41  49  8
Glucose(38)  *  11  23  34  2  -32
Glucose(38)  *  6  15  24  21  30  -8  -38  -29
Vanillin(38)  *  28  10  38  64  26
___  _____________  ------  ------  ......  ______------  ------  ------  ------  __
AVERAGE (weighted)*  23.60  14.28  13.27  23.45  36.69  25.80  -12.48  -21.06
Average (plain)  20.50  12.50  17.00  29.50  35.00  26.75  -20.67  -1.50
4  2  3  2  3  4  3  2
Miscellaneous Industries:
Paper(52)  *  6  13  20  28  8
Tyres(56)  *  32  6  38  47  9
BOPP Film(57)  *  21  9  11  30  32  43  11  13
PVC Tiles(57)  *  40  16  56  48  -8
Plastic Profiles(5*  33  6  7  39  40  44  4  5
…__  _  _  _  _  _  _  - ____  _-  _ _  ------  ------  _ _-  _  --  ___  ------  ------
AVERAGE  (weighted)*  31.10  6.07  12.60  37.84  37.20  46.18  2.71  9.01
Average  (plain)  26.40  7.00  11.75  35.67  37.00  42.00  3.75  9.00
5  3  4  3  4  5  4  3
Light Chemicals
Pesticides(63)  *  18  20  26  38  44  -1  -45  -39
Na  Ampicillin(Drug*  37  5  12  42  49  34  -15  -8
Magnetic  Oxides(68*  12  13  22  25  34  25  -9  0
…___________--  - _ _ _  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------ …------
AVERAGE (weighted)*  19.18  14.43  21.80  33.60  40.98  15.83  -25.15  -17.77
Average  (plain)  22.33  12.67  20.00  35.00  42.33  19.33  -23.00  -15.67
3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Other Engineering Industries:
Aluminum Extrusion*  -3  14  11  -19  -30
Aluminum Foil(75) *  16  8  11  24  27  8  -19  -16
Bearlngs(77)  *  15  37  37  52  52  4  -48  -48
Machine-Tools(81)  *  12  14  19  26  31  3  -28  -23
Power Handtools(84*  17  18  40  35  56  3  -53  -32
XLPE Cables(85)  *  22  49  51  71  73  -4  -77  -75
Jelly Pilled Cable*  38  11  17  49  55  43  -12  -6
Batteries(86)  *  32  28  60  26  -34
Fluoresc. Lamps(87*  11  23  31  34  42  26  -16  -8
Washing Machines(8*  31  5  7  36  38  30  -8  -6
Auto Electricals(9*  54  16  17  69  70  67  -3  -2
Carburettors(93)  *  18  24  30  42  48  3  -45  -39
Bus Bodies(93)  *  49  13  62  41  -21
2-^ Shock Absorber*  25  5  8  30  33  31  -2  1
…__  _  _--  _  _  _ _  ___-  _  _  - -___-  _  _ - - - ------  ------ …------
AVERAGE (weighted)*  24.63  17.64  23.00  44.21  45.33  19.19  -28.14  -22.00
Average (plain)  24.00  18.58  23.85  44.17  45.85  18.71  -28.85  -22.92
14  12  13  12  13  14  13  12
OVERALL AVERAGE(we*  35.52  11.85  19.71  52.55  66.23  43.52  -8.99  -3.43
OVERALL AVERAGE(pla  31.69  11.73  16.13  44.00  47.83  39.10  -9.00  -4.21
Sample size  58  48  54  48  54  58  54  48Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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